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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH
E. PENN SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
FRED W. ROYER and
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
12243

BRIEF O·F RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action wherein plaintiff-appellant seeks
damages for deprivation of the use of a vehicle which
was taken from plaintiff after he refused to surrender it
to its rightful owner's assignee, the defendant, Fred W.
Royer.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable Gordon R. Hall granted defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment by finding defendant
Royer had superior right to possession of the vehicle and
that plaintiff had no legal claim for damages.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-respondents seek to have Judge Hall's
decision affirmed and costs awarded to defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
lntermountain Gas and Oil Company purchased a
1966 Oldsmobile automobile from Poulos Motor Company, P. 0. Box 217, Magna, Utah, sometime prior to
September 15, 1966. (R-26, 28; cf. 36) Thereafter, the
said corporation acquired a certificate of title for the said
automobile. (R-18, 28, 41) lntermountain Gas and Oil
Company is a Utah Corporation duly authorized to do
business within the State of Utah and entitled to own
property in its own name. (R-29) At all times relevant
to the within action, Intermountain Gas and Oil Company, a corporation, owned the said 1966 Oldsmobile.
The use of the vehicle was loaned to the plaintiff. (R-21,
28, 41) Plaintiff refused to return the vehicle upon
demand by lntermountain Gas and Oil Company. (R-41)
Thereafter, the said owner assigned to the defendantrespondent, Fred W. Royer, the right of possession and
the right to collect damages for its wrongful detention.
(R-41) Mr. Royer filed an action in the Washington
County District Court pursuant to his assignment and
pursuant to 12-1-9 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 to seek
possession of the vehicle and damages. (R-18) The vehicle
was taken from plaintiff in January of 1968. (R-44)
Plaintiff-appellant filed the within suit as a separate
action November 5, 1968, against the defendants-respond2

ents who subsequently dismissed the prior suit against
plaintiff in Washington County about June 10, 1970.
(R-1, 49)
Plaintiffs sole claim to the vehicle and/ or damages
for his dispossession of it, is that allegedly one Austin
Smith and/or a corporation known as Gold Bar Resources
owed him some obligation under a real property lease
and orally promised to give plaintiff an interest in the
subject automobile. (R-1, 33, 34, 41, 44) Plaintiff has
not alleged nor claimed that either Gold Bar Resources
or Mr. Austin Smith has or ever had any legal or equitable
title to the subject vehicle. (R-1, 33, 34, 41, 44) In fact,
all ownership and legal interest in the vehicle at all
times relevant to this suit rested with defendant, Fred W.
Royer, and his assignor, lntermountain Gas and Oil Company. (R-28, 29, 41).
Plaintiff has produced no evidence that title was
ever transferred to him, that he paid any consideration
to any person for the automobile, nor that he ever checked
to see who owned the vehicle, after or before, he was
allegedly orally given some promise that title would be
conveyed to him in the future. (See entire record).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ONE WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO IMMEDIATE
POSSESSION MAY SEIZE PERSONAL PROPERTY,
WITH OR WITHOUT A COURT ORDER, AND NO
LIABILITY ENSURES FROM SUCH A SEIZURE;
THEREFORE, SINCE DEFENDANT ROYER AS AS-
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SIGNEE OF THE LEGAL OWNER HAD A RIGHT
TO IMMEDIATE POSSESSION, HE IS NOT LIABLE
IN ANY RESPECT TO PLAINTIFF.
A.

THE FACT THAT A WRIT OF REPLEVIN WAS
QUASHED DOES NOT AFFECT THE COMMON
LAW RIGHTS OF THE LEGAL OWNER OR HIS
ASSIGNEE TO SEIZE AND RETAIN POSSESSION OF PERSONAL PROPER1Y.

The plaintiff-respondent in the instant case has failed
to allege, claim or prove that any ownership interest to
the subject vehicle existed in the parties from whom he
claims an interest. His naked claim is that one Austin
Smith or a corporation known as Gold Bar Resources
orally promised to give him title to an automobile at
some time in the future as payment for a personal obligation owed by them. See plaintiff's Complaint, R-1; plaintiff's answers to defendants' interrogatories, R-33; and
plaintiff's affidavit, R-44. Also, it is important to note
that neither Gold Bar Resources Corporation nor Mr.
Austin Smith are parties to this action; therefore, any
alleged oral statements by them are hearsay when reported by the plaintiff and cannot be considered by the
Court. Rule 56 (e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
Hence, the relevant points of record when viewed
most favorably to the plaintiff shows that "paper title",
as plaintiff chooses entitle defendants' interest, was by
his own admission vested in lntermountain Gas and Oil
Company and its assignee, Fred W. Royer. See plaintiff's
brief P4; R-21, 28, 41. Defendant acquired physical
possession of the subject vehicle from one who held no
4

personal interest in the automobile. R-44 Later plaintiff
refused to deliver possession to lntermountain Gas and
Oil Company upon demand. R-41. The vehicle was subsequently seized from plaintiff's possession. Plaintiff filed
this suit and subsequently filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment; apparently satisfied with the record and feeling that no deposition should be taken of Mr. Austin
Smith or Gold Bar Resources Corporation. R-43.
Plaintiff's whole case, then, rests on the supposition
that replevin is the only remedy available to recover
possession of property by the legal owner, and that if a
replevin bond is posted before a subsequent seizure of
a chattel, a full for forfeiture must be ordered without
any proof of plaintiff's superior right of possession or
proof of damages. In support of this position, plaintiffrespondent has cited dicta from a 1922 Utah case and a
"general rule" from American Jurisprudence; a closer
look at the applicable law with reference to the facts of
this case is in order.
First it is important to note that defendant, Royer
did not dismiss the original suit brought against plaintiff
to recover possession of the subject vehicle until more
than two and one-half years after plaintiff filed the within
action, during which time the parties were actively prosecuting their positions in the within case. Since both cases
involved identical issues and facts, it was senseless to
have both cases pending and proceeding at the same
time. If plaintiff wished to try the issues in the instant
case and forum as is indicated by his suit, defendant
Royer was perfectly justified in dismissing his prior
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action. His dismissal is not tainted by the smell of wrong
doing of one who gets possession of a chattel by replevin
and immediately dismisses the court action in an attempt
to avoid a trial of the issues regarding possessory rights.
See cases cited 24 ALR 3rd 768 and dicta of Bankers
Commercial Security Trust Company, District Court of
Box Elder, Utah 211, Pac 187 (1922).
Therefore, the rule referred to by plaintiff, as with
all general rules, is subject to exceptions and refinements.
It is respectfully submitted that if the original possessor
of the chattels institute a separate action incorporating
the issues of the first action, a dismissal of the first is not
prejudicial to that individual in that his possessory right
may be heard; therefore, no bond for future should automatically be declared.
A second exception to the general rule is allowing
a court to order return of property or forfeiture of the
replevin undertaking where it " . . . appears from the
record that the defendant (the original party in possession)
is not entitled to possession of the property." Kerbey v.
Hume, 19 Ky. (3 TB Mon) 181 cited in 24 ALR 3rd 778.
In such a situation, one seizing property is not liable to
the party dispossed. Utah Law on this point is clear. A
replevin action is only ancillary to the underlying and
basic issue; that is, the right of final possession. This
point was stated in Kunz v. Nelson, 94 Utah 185, 76 Pac.
2d 577, 580, (1938):
"A moment's reflection ... will reveal that claim
and delivery is only ancillary to an action for pos6

session in order to retain or obtain possession
pending the trying out of those rights by the
Court."
Therefore, one may not complain about loss of possession
of property or damages from that loss, even if a replevin
action is defective, if he has no valid claim to that possession. This fundamental point of law is clearly stated
in the Restatement of Torts, Section 272:
"One who is entitled to immediate possession of
a chattel is not liable to another for dispossessing
him of it."
Hence, the germane and controlling issue of this
case is who has the superior right of possession.
B.

TO OBTAIN OWNERSHIP TO A MOTOR
VEHICLE, ONE MUST OBTAIN A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AND CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION; WITHOUT SUCH CERTIFICATES
ONE ACQUIRES NO INTEREST SUPERIOR TO
THE TITLE HOLDER, UNLESS SAID TITLE
HOLDER IS ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THAT
TITLE.

In Utah a comprehensive statute exists providing
for the registration of title certificates and of automobile
registration. These statutes specifically provide that:

"Until the department shall have issued a new
certificate of registration and certificate of ownership, delivery of any vehicle required to be registered shall be deemed not to have been made and
title thereto shall be deemed not to have passed,
and said intended transfer shall be deemed to be
incomplete and not to be valid or effective for any
purpose ... " 41-1-72 Utah Code Annotated (1953)
(Emphasis added)
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These exact words under the previous 1943 laws of the
State of Utah were ruled upon by this court. In Stewart
v. Commercial Insurance Company of Glen Falls, New
York, 114 Utah 278, 198 Pac. 2d 467 (1948), the court
noted that six heirs had failed to substantially comply
with this section in attempting to transfer title to a motor
vehicle; therefore, the court stated: " . . . no valid sale
was completed." Stewart v. Commercial Insurance Company of Glen Falls, N. Y., id at p. 471..
Title and registration laws of other states similar
or identical to Utah's have been held comparable in effect
to the Torrens system of registering title to real property.
Merchants Rating and Adjusting Company v. Skaug, 102
Pac. 2d 227 (Wash.
Although some courts have
held that these documents of title do not establish con·
elusively ownership, they do constitute prima facie evidence thereof. 7 Am ]ur 2d. "Automobiles and Highway
Traffic," §23. Utah has followed this position and no
superior interest may be acquired to the title holder with·
out the title holder being estopped to assert that title.
See, Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 41, 89 Pac. 2d 235 (1939),
as distinguished and modified in Stewart v. Commercial
Insurance Company of Glen Falls, New York, supra.
Plaintiff has cited two other Utah cases and repre·
sented that they hold differently from the above analysis
concerning the legal effect of title certificates. Even a
cursory reading shows that these cases both deal with a
situation where one with superior title is estopped to
assert that title against a bona fide purchaser for value.
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They do not change the law concerning ownership of
automobiles as provided in Section 41-1-72 Utah Code
Ann. (1933) cited and discussed above.
In Swartz v. White, 80 Utah 150, 13 Pac. 2d 643
( 1932), the title owner signed a certificate of title in blank
and delivered the same together with the vehicle, to a
salesman. These deliveries wre made to enable the salesman to sell the vehicle, but the vehicle was fraudulently
sold and the salesman absconded with the purchase price.
In a suit between the new purchaser and the original
owner, the Court held that the purchaser was not a bona
fide good faith purchaser; therefore, the original owner
prevailed. Significantly, the court said:
"(the buyer) ... must have known that any transfer of title from Mrs. White (the original owner)
to Steward (the salesman) was, by law, regarded
incomplete and not valid or effective for any purpose until properly registered in the office of the
Secretary of State and a new certificate issued to
the new owner." Swartz v. White, id at p. 646.
(Emphasis added)
The case of Heaston v. Martinez, 3 Utah 2d 259, 282
Pac. 2d 833 (1955) enunciates the same principles of law;
however, here the court found the new purchasers to be
bona fide good faith purchasers for value and that the
title owners were estopped to assert their title. The case
is distinguished factually from the White case because
out-of-state title holders voluntarily placed vehicles with
a used car dealership for resale, but retained title as
security for payment of a promissory note. Also significant to the court was the fact that under the provision
9

of 41-1-65 Utah Code Ann. (1953) no title transfer or
registration was necessary for automobile dealers; therefore, Section 41-1-72 Utah Code Ann. (1953) did not
apply to the car dealer. Again consistent with its previous statements, the court noted:
" ... (T)he Utah Supreme Court has ... held that
the Utah Motor Vehicle Act is some evidence of
title and provide a flag or warning to prospective
buyers, much as do registry acts relative to real
estate or chattel mortgages, such as would put '
prospective buyers on notice and require them to
make inquiry." Heaston v. Martinez, id at p. 836.
The matters of evidence in the case clearly show
ownership and right of possession in Intermountain Gas
and Oil Company and its assignee, Fred W. Royer. Plaintiff has not only failed to plead estoppel principles, but
has failed to produce any evidence to make him a bona
fide good faith purchaser for value. In fact under Heaston
v. Martinez he is specifically charged with notice by the
lack of a title certificate. Therefore, Judge Hall's ruling
finding no ownership interest superior to defendants was
proper and his order dismissing plaintiff's complaint
should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
If one can show a superior right of possession in
himself, he is not liable for dispossessing another of a
chattel. A certificate of title issued pursuant to 41-1-72
of the Utah Code Ann., 1953 is prima facie evidence of
that superior right an<l ownership; therefore, such owner's
assignee may dispossess another of possession without

liability.
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Under the facts of this case, no valid possessory right
as against the defendants was shown by plaintiff nor
were any circumstances alleged or shown as to create an
issue of fact concerning an estoppel against defendant's
asserting superior title and right. Therefore, Judge Hall's
order granting summary judgment should be affirmed
and defendants awarded their costs in this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
ROGER F. CUTLER
DAVIS AND CUTLER
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for
Defendants-Respondents
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